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Up the River Without a Permit: Why the Water 
Transfers Rule Endangers the Louisiana Wetlands 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) in the Clean Water Act (CWA) has been referred to as 
the “linchpin,” the “centerpiece,” and the “most important 
component” of the Clean Water Act.1 The NPDES permitting 
program is a major part of the invaluable protection the CWA 
provides for the Nation’s waters. Congress enacted the CWA in 
response to a growing crisis in the waters of the United States. In 
1972 Congress took a more aggressive stance on pollution control 
while maintaining a realistic view of the industrialized society 
Americans live in. The CWA allows the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to set maximum effluent limits for navigable waters 
and then issue permits so as to keep the pollution levels below 
those limits. Without a permit, it is unlawful to execute “any 
addition of any pollutant into navigable waters from any point 
source.”2 
At some point in the early 2000s, the EPA began to champion a 
theory known as the Unitary Waters Theory. The theory posits that 
each individual body of water in the United States is not distinct 
and individual at all, but rather is part of one unitary whole. If all 
waters are part of the same whole, a transfer from one to another 
will never be an “addition” to the whole. Under the Unitary Waters 
Theory, the Colorado River in the west and the Delaware River in 
the east are considered the same body of water. Therefore, taking a 
pollutant from the Delaware River and adding it to the Colorado 
River would not be an addition of a pollutant. This example 
highlights the flaw of the Unitary Waters Theory. 
Remarkably, even after receiving no support in the court 
system, the EPA still promulgated a notice and comment rule in 
the hope that the Unitary Waters Theory would gain legitimacy. 
Publishing an already flawed argument does not remove the flaws. 
However, upon conducting the Chevron Test for deference to 
agency action, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the wording of the 
statute is ambiguous on whether the waters of the United States 
should be considered a collection of independent and distinct water 
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bodies or one unitary whole.3 Further, the court held that the 
EPA’s Water Transfer Theory, now formalized as the Water 
Transfers Rule, was a reasonable interpretation of the Section 402 
requirements in the CWA.4 As one commentator put it, “one may 
be better off drinking whiskey than the dirty water the EPA is 
fighting to save from NPDES regulation through its unitary waters 
theory.”5 
This Comment will outline the myriad of problems caused by 
the Water Transfers Rule and how it affects Louisiana in 
particular. It will analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Friends 
of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District6 
and explain why the court erred in granting Chevron deference to 
the rule, including why the statute is clear and why the EPA’s 
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. It will also describe 
why concerns over federal usurpation of state responsibility are 
misplaced. After establishing that the Water Transfers Rule is 
flawed and that NPDES permits should be required for transfers 
from one meaningfully distinct body of water to another, this 
Comment will determine that the Louisiana wetlands are a 
meaningfully distinct body of water, separate from the Mississippi 
River and the Gulf of Mexico. For this reason, Water Quality 
Standards and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) should be 
established for the Louisiana wetlands. Any transfer of water 
containing pollutants into the wetlands should require an NPDES 
permit under Section 402 of the CWA. This Comment will 
conclude by addressing concerns that a permitting system is overly 
expensive absent the Water Transfers Rule and establish that using 
the existing NPDES permitting program along with a Water 
Quality Credit Trading Program will keep the permitting cost 
down and produce real reductions in pollutant discharges into the 
wetlands.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Federal water regulation began as a way for the government to 
assert control over the Nation’s waters to promote interstate 
commerce. As industrialization took its toll on the waters, the 
Federal Government began to take on the role of protecting the 
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water itself in the interest of the health of the environment. As 
legislation progressed, the balance between federal and state 
control over the waters has changed as well, ultimately leading to a 
healthy balance where the Federal Government sets a general 
framework within which the states are free to assert their own 
regulations. In response to overly ambitious goals, the more recent 
trend in water regulation has been towards enacting regulations 
that promote feasible solutions to water pollution.  
A. Pre Clean Water Act Legislation Falls Short of Accomplishing 
Clean Water 
The first instance of federal regulation of the Nation’s 
waterways occurred in 1899 with the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriations Act (RHAA).7 Since then, the Federal Government 
has expanded its control over the waters of the United States in 
both a commercial and an environmental interest. The RHAA 
included several sections that are still in force today, including 
Section 108 and Section 13, also known as the Refuse Act.9 Section 
10 made it unlawful “to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter 
or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of” navigable 
waters.10 Section 10 mandates a permit to alter the course of a 
United States waterway.11 The Refuse Act made it unlawful to 
discharge refuse into navigable waters or their tributaries.12  
In 1948, the Federal Government took on a more supportive 
role, secondary to the states, by passing The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).13 Under the FWPCA, the Federal 
Government provided money and technical services to state 
pollution control programs.14 However, this supportive role of the 
Federal Government did not last long.  
In 1961 Congress passed a set of amendments that returned 
responsibility for water pollution control back to the Federal 
Government. These amendments increased federal power to 
initiate enforcement conferences, although initiation of these 
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conferences still required a state governor’s request.15 
Significantly, the 1961 amendments also broadened the definition 
of “interstate or navigable waters” to include all coastal waters.16  
In 1965 Congress passed The Water Quality Act.17 The Water 
Quality Act was another expansion of the Federal Government’s 
responsibility to control water pollution in that the Act 
implemented the establishment of water quality standards for 
interstate waters.18 States were to create these standards and submit 
them to the new Water Pollution Control Administration for 
approval before implementation.19 The shortcomings of these 
amendments were that they did not allow for a federal 
implementation plan in the event of a state’s failure to act, nor did 
they control individual sources of pollution.20 These failures would 
be addressed within ten years. 
Unfortunately, none of these amendments had much effect on 
improving the water quality of the United States.21 Prior to 1970, 
the Federal Government initiated just one enforcement action 
under the FWPCA.22 In fact, were it not for two Supreme Court 
decisions expanding the power of the Refuse Act in pollution 
control,23 the FWPCA might have been nothing more than a farce. 
B. The 1972 Amendments Become the CWA 
In 1972 the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio caught fire 
because of high levels of pollutants on the river’s surface. This 
incident alerted Congress to the harm incurred by the 
industrialization of the 20th century.24 The Cuyahoga disaster 
prompted Congress to pass the Water Pollution Control Act of 
1972.  
Because the FWPCA was well accepted by diverse groups, 
many of the substantive parts of the FWPCA were retained in the 
CWA.25 Generally, the 1972 Amendments focused on feasibility.26 
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The Amendments established pollution standards for categories of 
point sources, making the standards simpler and clearer for 
industrial polluters.27 Point sources were distinguished into 
existing and new point sources and then further distinguished into 
those that were publicly owned and those that were non-publicly 
owned.28 For existing point sources, both publicly and non-
publicly owned point sources had a two-step process for 
implementation of new standards.29 Publicly owned treatment 
works must “employ the best treatment control technology over the 
life of the works.”30 Non-publicly owned point sources, on the 
other hand, had to employ the “best practicable control technology 
currently available” (BPT) by 1977 and since 1983, must now 
employ the “best available control technology economically 
achievable” (BAT).31 While these new standards added clarity and 
certainty to the water pollution problem in the United States, the 
most significant contribution to the feasibility-focused approach 
was the creation of permits that made the standards more palatable 
to industry.32 
                                                                                                             
 
allowed for permits as a way around an absolute prohibition of discharges. Id. 
Environmental groups supported it because it expanded the federal jurisdiction 
beyond the navigable waters of the United States and created the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at 537. Local governments supported the Act 
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technology necessary to achieve those standards made them practical. Id. at 540 
n.94. BAT standards differ from BPT standards in that the cost is now only one 
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the best performers in an industrial category as the reference point and these 
standards were to be implemented with only partial consideration of cost. Id. at 
540 n.95. 
 32. While a full description of the permits introduced by the 1972 
legislation is beyond the scope of this paper, many of the permits introduced 
were maintained in the Clean Water Act and are still in effect today. See 
Murchison, supra note 7, at 541–50. 




C. The Clean Water Act 
The 1972 FWPCA came under fire for being both overly 
ambitious and under-inclusive.33 Therefore, Congress once again 
amended the legislation in an attempt to make pollution control 
significant and realistic. This attempt is known as the 1977 Clean 
Water Act.34  
Section 301 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants 
into navigable waters.35 However, in keeping with the feasibility 
approach, individuals or industries can obtain NPDES permits that 
allow them to dump a set amount of pollutants into a certain body 
of water at a certain point source.36 Included in Section 402 is a 
provision that allows states to create their own NPDES programs 
subject to EPA approval.37 The EPA may suspend or withdraw the 
approval of a state’s program.38 Another important aspect of the 
NPDES program is an individual’s ability to sue the EPA for a 
failure to properly monitor the United States waterways.39 
Significantly, the CWA kept the 1972 permit system as an attempt 
to stay true to the feasibility approach to water quality control. 
Two permits are of particular concern in this Comment: 
Section 10 permits and Section 402 permits. Section 10 permits are 
required whenever one wishes to alter the course or navigability of 
a waterway of the United States40 and are mostly useful in 
regulating the waterways as channels of commerce under the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.41 However, 
Section 10 permits can also be used to regulate pollution. Section 
402 provides for NPDES permits and are most significant because 
they are most affected by the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule of 
2008.42  
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The NPDES is a step-by-step process. First, the EPA must set 
water quality standards for each body of water.43 These standards 
are established through Section 301 of the CWA, which directs 
states to establish effluent limitations on all point sources.44 If the 
standards can be met through available technology, the EPA will 
issue NPDES permits in accordance with that technology and the 
determined standards.45 If the established standards cannot be met 
through the available technology, the EPA must then establish 
TMDLs for each distinct water body and issue NPDES permits in 
accordance with the TMDLs so that each point source is allowed to 
contribute only a proportionate part of the TMDL.46 The complex 
process for establishing water quality standards and issuing 
NPDES permits, however, pales in comparison with the difficulty 
of determining when an NPDES violation has occurred.  
D. NPDES Violations Serve as the Centerpiece of the CWA 
NPDES permitting requirements were enacted under Section 
402 of the CWA. These permits replaced Section 13 Refuse Act 
permits under the RHAA.47 An NPDES violation has five 
elements: (1) there must be a discharge of (2) a pollutant (3) from 
a point source (4) into navigable waters (5) without a permit.48 
“Discharge of pollutants” as defined in the CWA is “any addition 
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”49 It is 
important to define “pollutant,” “navigable waters,” “point 
source,” and most difficultly, “addition.”  
First, the CWA defines “pollutant” narrowly. The CWA states, 
“The term ‘pollutant’ means . . . ” without using includes.50 This 
indicates the items listed are exhaustive and not merely 
exemplary.51 The pollutants listed include, among other things, 
biological materials, heat, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and agricultural 
waste discharged into water.52 Additionally, the definition lists 
certain things that are expressly excluded from the definition of 
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pollutant, which further supports a narrow interpretation of 
pollutant.53  
Second, a “point source” in the CWA is defined as “any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include 
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated 
agriculture.”54 Significantly, this definition gives an exemplary, but 
not exhaustive, list of possible point sources. The only specificity 
given is the exclusion sentence stating what is not included. 
“[A]gricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from 
irrigated agriculture”55 both fall under the separate category of 
nonpoint source discharges and are delegated to the states to 
regulate.56 However, the Supreme Court determined that in order 
to be considered a point source, the sources do not have to actually 
contribute the pollutants themselves to the body of water, but the 
sources must merely be capable of transporting the pollutants.57 
Lower courts have determined that dams and pumps are both 
considered point sources.58 A river diversion would also be a 
“discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.”59  
Third, “navigable waters” is used as a jurisdictional term, 
defined as “waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas.”60 This is a broader meaning than the traditional notion that 
navigable waters are those waters that are navigable in fact.61 For 
example, in 1985 the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) 
determined that wetlands that abut a navigable creek are protected 
by the CWA.62 This is a reasonable interpretation because the 
purpose of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the . . . integrity 
of”63 the waters of the United States, and the best way to achieve 
this is to also control all things that have a hydrologic connection 
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with the navigable waters.64 The definition of “navigable waters” 
continued to evolve, and in 2001 the Supreme Court introduced the 
Significant Nexus Test.65 For an area to be considered part of the 
waters of the United States, the area in question must have a 
significant nexus to waters that are navigable in fact.66  
The latest case to define “navigable waters” provided more 
uncertainty than it did clarity. In Rapanos v. United States, the 
Supreme Court faced the question of whether ditches and drains 
near wetlands were “navigable waters” under the CWA.67 The 
Court produced a 4-1-4 split decision with three different methods 
of determination.68 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion in 
which the Court remanded the case to the Corps to determine 
whether the ditches or drains near each wetland were waters of the 
United States.69 In order to be included as “waters of the United 
States,” the waters in question must be (1) relatively permanent, 
standing, or continuously flowing, and (2) must have a continuous 
surface connection to other regulated bodies of water.70 In the 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed with remanding the case to 
the Corps to decide the factual question of whether the ditches or 
drains were waters of the United States, but he also advocated a 
broader definition of “navigable waters” to include all waterways 
with an ecologically significant nexus.71 In Kennedy’s view, if a 
waterway has a significant hydrological downstream effect on 
navigable waters, it will be considered a navigable waterway under 
the CWA.72 Kennedy also stated in his concurrence that he did not 
support regulation based merely on speculation; instead, he 
advocated that there should be a case-by-case analysis to determine 
if there was actually a significant effect on downstream navigable 
waters.73 Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality by claiming that 
their definition would exclude seasonable rivers that dry up during 
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dry seasons and flow steady during the spring as a result of 
snowmelt.74 In the dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court 
should defer completely to the discretion of the Corps in 
determining what is navigable and what is not as long as the 
Corps’ decision supports the purpose of the CWA, which the Court 
found it did.75  
In any case, the Louisiana wetlands that lie directly adjacent to 
both the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico would be 
considered waters of the United States under all three 
interpretations because the Louisiana wetlands lie adjacent to the 
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, both of which are 
navigable in fact and therefore waters of the United States. 
Rapanos did not overturn the prior settled jurisprudence from 
Riverside Bayview Homes, which held that wetlands that directly 
abut navigable waters are also included under the jurisdiction of 
the CWA.  
Lastly, the term “addition” has stirred much debate mostly due 
to the fact that the CWA does not define “addition.” Commentators 
have identified two prevailing schools of thought concerning the 
definition of an addition in the context of the CWA.76 Some 
commentators argue in support of a traditional view while others 
argue in support of the Unitary Waters Theory.77 The traditional 
view takes the stance that the movement of pollutants from one 
meaningfully distinct body of water to another is an addition.78 In 
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, the Supreme Court, without deciding the validity of the 
Unitary Waters Theory, remanded the case to the lower court to 
determine as a preliminary matter, whether the two water bodies in 
question were “meaningfully distinct.”79 Prior to that decision, in 
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, the plaintiffs urged the 
D.C. Circuit to adopt the principle that “any adverse change in the 
quality of reservoir water from its natural state involves a 
‘pollutant’ and that release of polluted water through the [point 
source] into the downstream river constitutes the ‘addition’ of a 
pollutant to navigable waters ‘from’ a point source.”80 The 
traditional approach can be summed up as follows: if the two water 
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bodies in question are determined to be meaningfully distinct, then 
the transfer of any pollutant between them by means of a point 
source requires an NPDES permit because that transfer constitutes 
an “addition” of a pollutant from a point source. If the two water 
bodies are determined not to be meaningfully distinct, no NPDES 
permit is needed for any transfer of polluted water because there is 
no “addition.”  
Alternatively, the Unitary Waters Theory has a much narrower 
interpretation of what qualifies as an “addition.” This theory was 
first presented in Gorsuch, which questioned whether water that 
passed through a dam and back into the same water body needed 
an NPDES permit.81 All sides agreed that dams are point sources 
within the definition provided in the CWA.82 The issue was 
whether the effects of the dam constituted an “addition of 
pollutants.”83 The EPA presented the view that an “addition” of a 
pollutant only occurs if the point source itself introduces the 
pollutant, and not if the point source simply transfers the pollutant 
from one body of water to another.84 Hence, the introduction of a 
pollutant into a water body is only an addition if it comes from the 
outside world.85 Essentially, Unitary Waters proponents contend 
that Congress intended that all waters within the borders of the 
United States be treated as one big body of water.86 Ultimately, the 
court held that the EPA’s interpretation that the alterations from 
the dams were not pollutants under the NPDES permit program 
was reasonable, so the question of what constituted an “addition” 
was left unanswered.87  
E. Limited Exclusions from NPDES Permits 
Section 402 allows for some exceptions from NPDES permit 
requirements. Under Section 318, the EPA has the authority to 
allow the discharge of certain pollutants under certain conditions 
when done as part of an aquaculture project.88 Also excepted are 
permits issued under Section 404 of the CWA,89 which are 
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Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and hence the Court did 
not refer to “Chevron deference.” 
 85. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165. 
 86. Hande, supra note 5, at 412. 
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required for the discharge of dredged or fill material.90 The 
separation of 402 and 404 permits is significant. Section 404 
allows for the issuance of general permits, whereas Section 402 
does not.91 More importantly, 404 permits fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Corps92 and 402 permits fall under the 
jurisdiction of the EPA.93 When the jurisdiction of the Corps is 
invoked, there should also be an analysis of whether a Section 10 
permit for the alteration of the navigability of a waterway is 
needed.94 If a point source falls under the authority of the Corps 
pursuant to a Section 10 permit, the CWA will not apply because 
of the express prohibition in Section 511 of the CWA.95 Following 
this progression, the issuance of a 404 permit could completely 
preclude the requirement of an NPDES permit.  
Other exclusions from NPDES permits include agricultural 
return flows and stormwater runoff from oil, gas, and mining 
operations.96 Under Section 208 of the CWA these nonpoint 
sources are regulated according to area-wide waste treatment 
management plans to be implemented by the states.97 The EPA’s 
NPDES permitting system already faces a major limitation in that 
the EPA cannot use Section 402 to override the plans set forth by 
the states.98 The Water Transfers Rule adds another limitation by 
exempting any pollutants discharged in water transfers.  
F. Problems in the Louisiana Wetlands 
The Mississippi River carries numerous pollutants in its waters. 
Of primary concern are dangerously high concentrations of 
phosphorus and nitrogen.99 These pollutants cause the annual dead 
zone in the Gulf of Mexico by creating giant algae blooms.100 The 
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algae blooms die off and decompose, taking all of the oxygen out 
of the water.101 The dead zone has grown in size over the years. In 
2008, the dead zone was measured at a size of 20,720 km2 or 
roughly the size of the entire state of New Jersey.102 Contributing 
to the expansion of the dead zone are the existing river diversions 
in the Atchafalaya River basin.103 The shallow water of the basin’s 
wetlands prevents the oxygen-depleted water from settling to the 
bottom of the Gulf as it does at the mouth of the Mississippi.104 
The dead zone leads to the death of fish and shellfish in the area or 
their migration to other areas of the Gulf, which has a devastating 
impact on the local economies of Louisiana. The dead zone costs 
the United States’ economy an estimated $50 million a year.105 
Unfortunately, the majority of the nitrogen and phosphorus 
comes from upstream, outside of Louisiana’s borders.106 Nitrogen 
and phosphorus are by-products of fertilizers and manure that 
come from field runoff and discharge from sewage treatment 
plants and industrial facilities, all of which are considered nonpoint 
sources and qualify under Section 208 plans. Because of their 
source, Louisiana is unable to regulate them in any meaningful 
manner and cannot petition the EPA to regulate them because of 
the nonpoint source exception.107 In fact, no federal enforcement 
mechanism is in place to combat pollution coming from nonpoint 
sources.108 Louisiana is in desperate need of an alternative method 
to control the nitrogen and phosphorus levels in the Mississippi 
River.  
Recently, a lot of controversy has centered on Louisiana’s 
Coastal Plan to rebuild and preserve the wetlands along the 
Louisiana coast.109 The proposed plan calls for sediment diversions 
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from the river into the marshes and wetlands of the state.110 
Sediment diversions distribute sediment in addition to freshwater 
in an attempt to rebuild land and combat saltwater intrusion to help 
freshwater plant life grow.111 Opponents of the plan criticize the 
diversions on the basis that the diversions will lead to more 
pollutants in the wetlands.112 More nutrient pollution will lead to a 
higher level of decomposition and loss of soil strength, which can 
cause a deterioration of plant life and more land loss due to the 
lack of a root system to hold the soil in place.113  
II. CURRENT ISSUES 
In 2008 the EPA promulgated the Water Transfers Rule, which 
endangers the waterways of the United States by loosening 
restrictions on discharging pollutants. The Water Transfers Rule 
goes directly against the stated goals of the CWA and risks the 
progress made since 1972 on cleaning the Nation’s waters. The 
Eleventh Circuit made an egregious error when they granted 
Chevron deference to the EPA on their impermissible 
interpretation of the clear wording of the CWA.  
A. EPA’s Water Transfers Rule of 2008 Goes Against the Stated 
Goals of the CWA 
The national goal of the CWA is to eliminate the “discharge of 
pollutants into the navigable waters.”114 Furthermore, the CWA 
aims to provide “for the protection and propagation of fish, 
shellfish, and wildlife and [provide] for recreation in and on the 
water.”115 Significantly, Section 101 of the CWA explicitly states 
that the Act should be used to control both point and nonpoint 
sources of pollution.116 All three of these explicitly stated goals are 
ignored in the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule.  
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Under the first goal of the CWA, if one puts pollutants into a 
body of water and increases the pollution levels of that water, then 
that person has illegally discharged pollutants into the navigable 
waters. However, the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule goes directly 
against this clearly stated policy goal by allowing pollutants to 
enter into a water body, adding to the pollution level of that water 
body. The second goal is also in jeopardy. Allowing pollutants in 
the Mississippi River to enter into the wetlands and the Gulf of 
Mexico without a permit creates a dead zone that leads to the 
death, or at best, a jubilee of the fish, shellfish and wildlife in the 
waters.117 The Water Transfers Rule allows this activity without 
regulation. The third goal was enacted in 1987 in response to the 
failure of Section 208 to regulate nonpoint sources as intended.118 
Nonpoint sources, as the most significant source of water 
pollutants in the country, contribute more pollutants than point 
sources.119 The Water Transfers Rule perpetuates the already 
absent control over nonpoint source pollutants by allowing them to 
pass through point sources without regulation. The three goals 
mentioned above, and the failure of the Water Transfers Rule to 
adhere to them, highlight the need to strengthen the NPDES 
program, not weaken it.  
1. The Beginning: The Unitary Waters Theory 
The Water Transfers Rule evolved from the Unitary Waters 
Theory, which holds that all waters within the borders of the 
United States are considered to be one big body of water.120 Prior 
to any formal enactment, the courts uniformly rejected the Unitary 
Waters Theory. The theory is based on the wording of the 
definition of “discharge of pollutants” which says it is “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.”121 The use of “navigable waters” as opposed to “any 
navigable waters” is the focal point of the argument the EPA put 
forth in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians.122 This was the same argument put forward in 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New 
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York (Catskill I)123 and again in Catskill II.124 In all three instances, 
the argument failed.  
In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the 
Unitary Waters Theory because it was not advanced at the 
appellate level.125 However, the Court criticized the theory on the 
grounds that the CWA does not exempt nonpoint sources from 
NPDES permitting when those sources also qualify as point 
sources.126 The Court further criticized the theory by pointing to 
several other provisions of the NPDES that suggest the permits are 
meant to protect individual bodies of water as well as the waters of 
the United States as a whole.127 Because the issue was not raised, 
however, the Court left the question over the validity of the 
Unitary Waters Theory open to the Eleventh Circuit on remand.128 
In Catskill I the Second Circuit considered the Unitary Waters 
Theory under the “one pot” analogy.129 This analogy explains that 
if a person uses a ladle to spoon some soup out of a pot and then 
pours the same soup back into the same pot, nothing has been 
“added” to the pot.130 The Second Circuit refused to apply Chevron 
deference and, just as the Supreme Court did, criticized the EPA 
for never formalizing the Unitary Waters Theory in a notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.131 The Second Circuit 
instead examined the theory under the Mead standard.132 Finding 
the Unitary Waters Theory unpersuasive, the court refused to grant 
deference.133 The court criticized the theory by stating that “[n]o 
one can reasonably argue that the water in the Reservoir and the 
[creek] are in any sense the ‘same,’ such that ‘addition’ of one to 
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the other is a logical impossibility.”134 The EPA responded to the 
criticism by publishing its 2005 Interpretation Paper.135  
2. EPA Responds: 2005 EPA Interpretation Paper 
In the EPA’s 2005 Interpretation Paper, the Agency considered 
the question to be “whether movement of pollutants from one 
navigable water to another by a water transfer is the ‘addition’ of a 
pollutant potentially subjecting the activity to the permitting 
requirement under Section 402 of the Act.”136 The EPA focused its 
discussion on the balance between state and federal responsibility 
for water monitoring and used statutory and historical 
interpretations while noting that there had been no previous formal 
statement by the EPA on the issue.137  
Under its statutory interpretation, the EPA first considered the 
statute as a whole and noted that absurd results should be 
avoided.138 The EPA then argued that the overriding direction of 
the CWA is to not interfere with states’ water allocations and that 
it was Congress’ intent to leave nonpoint source pollution control 
to the states.139 The EPA found it was reasonable to interpret 
“addition” in Section 402 to not include transfers because 
Congress intended to control pollutants at the initial source instead 
of waiting until after they are already in the waters of the United 
States.140  
Regarding individual case evaluations, the EPA’s 
Interpretation Paper first stated that a case-by-case analysis should 
be avoided altogether, but if individual analyses are needed, the 
“meaningfully distinct” test should be used narrowly in a two-step 
process.141 The first step examines whether the water bodies in the 
transfer are distinct. If the water bodies are or ever have been part 
of the same, they are not distinct.142 A full evaluation of the 
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hydrological connection between the two bodies of water should 
be conducted, including both man-made conveyances, such as a 
pump, and natural conveyances.143 If the two water bodies are 
determined to be distinct, the second step examines whether the 
distinct water bodies are meaningfully distinct. This analysis 
essentially focuses on environmentally significant interactions 
between the two. The EPA stated the “specific context of the 
transfer should be evaluated to determine whether the transfer 
would have a substantial adverse impact on the receiving water 
body [sic].”144 The Interpretation Paper concluded by stating that it 
was the EPA’s stance that Congress intended water transfers to not 
be regulated by Section 402 permits, but rather by the states and 
that the EPA intends to initiate a rule making process.145 
Following the Interpretation Paper, the Second Circuit heard 
Catskill II. Rejecting the Unitary Waters Theory again, the Second 
Circuit relied on Miccosukee and stated that the Supreme Court 
implied that “at least in the context of the CWA, the unitary water 
theory has no place.”146 The court also considered arguments by 
the EPA, labeled “holistic arguments,” that objected to interference 
with the allocation of rights and responsibilities between the EPA 
and the states regarding states’ rights to allocate their own water. 
The court rejected this argument just as it did in Catskill I.147 In 
Catskill II the Second Circuit applied the plain language of the 
statute to conclude, contrary to the EPA’s assertion, that the 
Unitary Waters Theory was not consistent with Congress’ intent in 
the CWA.148 
3. EPA Promulgates a Rule: Water Transfers Rule 
The final rule issued by the EPA explains that a “[w]ater 
transfer means an activity that conveys or connects waters of the 
United States without subjecting the transferred water to 
intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.”149 The EPA 
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states that water transfers do not require NPDES permits because 
there is no “addition” of a pollutant.150 
In explaining its rationale for this rule, the EPA begins by 
explaining the legal framework for its rule and then examines the 
statutory language and the legislative history of the CWA. As the 
Eleventh Circuit stated, because the EPA had promulgated a rule, 
any judicial review now had to be done under the Chevron test.151 
The EPA concedes that the term “addition” has been interpreted by 
some courts as being the transfer of water from one meaningfully 
distinct body of water to another.152 However, the EPA relies on 
other courts’ interpretations that a pollutant must come from the 
outside world and merely passing through a point source such as a 
dam or a pump does not require regulation under the NPDES.153 
These courts, however, were interpreting the use of the word 
“addition” very narrowly. For instance, in Gorsuch, the D.C. 
Circuit decided to limit the term “addition” to a situation where a 
dam was putting water back into the same water body that it came 
from.154 It is important to note that because a dam can be 
considered a point source,155 it logically follows that point sources 
do not necessarily have to divide two “meaningfully distinct water 
bodies.”156 For example, a dam in the middle of a river does not 
make the river two distinct bodies of water.157 Once the point 
source introduces a pollutant, it then becomes an “addition” and is 
subject to NPDES permitting.158 It is unlikely the D.C. Circuit 
would have excluded the dam from permitting had water been 
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taken from the dam and transported to another, separate river, yet 
this is exactly what the EPA is contending in its Water Transfers 
Rule.  
The EPA goes on to explain that in statutory interpretation, 
statutes should be interpreted as a whole to determine their purpose 
and intent and yet, astoundingly, the EPA is still able to conclude 
that Congress intended a narrow view of the term “addition” in the 
definition of “discharge of pollutants.”159 Remember Section 101 
of the CWA states that the goal is to control both point and 
nonpoint sources of pollution,160 and further, the goal is to 
eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.161 The 
EPA justifies their radical view by arguing that Congress’ primary 
intent was to maintain a balance between federal and state control 
over waterways and that this concern should take precedent over 
the other explicit goals of the CWA.162 While this is a concern of 
the CWA, it is hardly the primary concern given the move since 
1961 towards more federal involvement.163 Also, as the Second 
Circuit stated, “the CWA balances a welter of consistent and 
inconsistent goals. In contrast with [this concern], the CWA also 
expressly includes a broad and uncompromising policy of 
‘restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”164 Further, the court stated that, 
“[w]here a statute seeks to balance competing policies, 
congressional intent is not served by elevating one policy above 
the others, particularly where the balance struck in the text is 
sufficiently clear to point to an answer.”165 Nevertheless, after a 
short analysis of the legislative history of the CWA, the Water 
Transfers Rule concludes, as it did in its statutory analysis, that 
Congress intended to leave more power with the states to control 
water pollution in order to avoid duplicative legislation in the 
states that already had control over water transfers.166  
B. Enter the Eleventh Circuit. 
Very shortly after the EPA promulgated its Water Transfers 
Rule the Eleventh Circuit heard Friends of the Everglades v. South 
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Florida Water Management District to determine whether the 
Water Transfers Rule applies to water transfers from polluted 
canals in South Florida to Lake Okeechobee.167 The situation in 
Friends of the Everglades is markedly similar to the circumstances 
occurring in southern Louisiana. In southern Florida water flow is 
controlled by a system of canals and pump stations similar to that 
in Louisiana.168 The Everglades swamp lies to the south of Lake 
Okeechobee where a series of canals were dug to help drain runoff 
from sugar cane fields.169 These canals carry chemicals such as 
nitrogen and phosphorus and have low oxygen content.170 Pumps 
are used to transfer the polluted water in the canals uphill into Lake 
Okeechobee, which is used for recreational activities.171 As noted 
in the opinion, these pumps do not add any pollutants into the 
water, but merely transfer it from one water body to another 
through pipes.172  
The Eleventh Circuit started its discussion by considering the 
necessary elements for requiring a permit and establishing what 
was present and what was missing.173 There needed to be an 
“addition of any pollutants to navigable waters from any point 
source.”174 Nitrogen, phosphorus, low oxygen, and other chemicals 
in the water all qualified as pollutants.175 Lake Okeechobee was a 
navigable waterway and the pumps were point sources.176 The only 
remaining question was whether there was an “addition” by 
moving the pollutants from one navigable waterway to another.177 
The District Court decided this was an addition.178 However, this 
decision came before the EPA promulgated the Water Transfers 
Rule. 
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s opinion 
under a newly promulgated rule and had to decide how much 
deference to grant that rule. Before going into a discussion of 
Chevron deference, the court summarized the Unitary Waters Rule 
and its widespread failure in the courts, including the Eleventh 
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Circuit itself.179 However, as the court pointed out, prior 
interpretations do not matter under Chevron; all that matters is that 
the agency provides a “reasonable construction of an ambiguous 
statute.”180 The issue to be decided was whether the word 
“addition,” as used in Section 402, was ambiguous. The court 
examined “the text of the statute, its structure, and its stated 
purpose.”181 On one side, “addition to the waters of the United 
States” refers to the waters as one unit (all the rivers, lakes, 
streams, canals, etc. of the United States are all the same water).182 
Alternatively, “addition to the waters of the United States” means 
additions to one discrete body of water from another separate and 
discrete body of water.183 The court held that the absence of the 
word “any” before “navigable waters” created ambiguity because it 
is present in other instances throughout the CWA, including the 
same section at issue.184 The court further held that examining the 
statute as a whole did not alleviate any of the ambiguity.185 The 
court relied on the fact that other provisions in the Act seemed 
contrary to the stated purpose of the statute as a whole.186 
Essentially, the court’s rationale was that because other parts of the 
statute may be questionable, this part must be questionable as well.  
Because the court held the statute to be ambiguous, it turned 
next to whether the EPA’s interpretation of the statute was 
reasonable. The court attempted to solve the problem through a 
simple hypothetical involving marbles and buckets where the 
marbles represented pollution and the buckets represented bodies 
of water.187 The court framed the hypothetical this way: 
Two buckets sit side by side, one with four marbles in it 
and the other with none. There is a rule prohibiting “any 
addition of any marbles to buckets by any person.” A 
person comes along, picks up two marbles from the first 
bucket, and drops them into the second bucket. Has the 
marble-mover “add[ed] any marbles to buckets”?188 
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When phrased in this simplistic and isolated language, it is 
possible to see some ambiguity. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit 
granted the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule deference under Chevron, 
finding it to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute.189  
III. WHY THE WATER TRANSFERS RULE FAILS 
The Eleventh Circuit erred in granting the EPA’s Water 
Transfer Rule Chevron deference. Under the Chevron analysis, the 
first step is to determine if the language of the enabling statute is 
clear and unambiguous.190 If the language of the statute is clear as 
to the intent of Congress, then that is the end of the discussion.191 
If the language is ambiguous, however, the court next must 
determine not what the best interpretation of the statute is, but 
rather whether the interpretation adopted by the regulating agency 
is permissible.192 The Eleventh Circuit erred when it said the 
language of the statute was ambiguous. The language of the statute 
is clear; any alternative interpretation exceeds the statutory 
authority Congress granted the EPA under the CWA. Further, even 
if there were ambiguity in the language of the statute, the Water 
Transfers Rule would still fail. The EPA’s interpretation of the rule 
is not permissible because it goes against the stated policy of the 
CWA.  
A. The Statutory Language is Clear and Unambiguous 
In the case of 402 permits, the language is “sufficiently clear to 
point to an answer.”193 Permits are required for the “discharge of 
any pollutant” into the waters of the United States.194 “Discharge 
of any pollutant” is defined in the context of the CWA as “any 
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.”195 This language is clear. The EPA’s interpretation 
perverts the common understanding of the word “addition.”196 The 
Eleventh Circuit’s misguided attempt to break down the issue into 
a simplistic analogy of marbles and buckets fails for the simple 
reason that pollutants are not marbles and the water bodies of the 
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United States are not buckets. In the court’s analogy, marbles are 
seen exactly as they are: neutral, innocuous items. If the rule is that 
no marbles can be added to buckets, the rule seems completely 
arbitrary and without meaning because marbles have no negative 
characteristics. In reality, however, the discussion is not about 
marbles. It is about toxic pollutants that kill plant and animal life 
and cost the country millions of dollars in damage every year.  
A better hypothetical would be to say that the marbles are toxic 
and when they come into contact with the buckets, the 
contamination requires an expensive and resource-exhausting 
process to remove them from the buckets and restore the buckets to 
their original state. Phrased this way, it is clear that the purpose of 
the “no addition of any marbles rule” is to keep as many buckets 
free of marbles as possible. Putting additional marbles in a bucket 
undeniably goes against the clear intent of the rule.  
Further, as other commentators have suggested, the term 
“navigable waters” is nothing more than a jurisdictional term used 
to define where the EPA has authority.197 As Reagen points out, 
the Friends of the Everglades court incorrectly focused on the 
absence of a word instead of what was actually there.198 The court 
should have focused on where the term “any” is used.199 The 
statute explicitly states that the discharge of a pollutant is “any 
addition . . . ”200 This shows Congress’ obvious intent for a broad 
interpretation of the word addition. “[A]ny addition” clearly means 
a permit is required for anything added to a body of “navigable 
water.”201 Even looking solely at the term “navigable waters,” the 
court again ignored what is actually there and focused on what is 
not. Congress did not use the singular term, “navigable water,” but 
rather the plural, “waters.”202 The use of the plural form makes it 
clear Congress is not referring to “one unitary body of water,” but 
multiple distinct bodies of water.  
The court also ignored another significant part of the statute. In 
Section 101(g) of the CWA, Congress explicitly used the term 
“reduce” in setting the policy of the CWA.203 The use of the word 
“reduce” is more indicative of congressional intent than the 
absence of a word, just as congressional action is more indicative 
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than Congress’ failure to act.204 Transferring water that contains 
pollutants from one body of water to another distinct body of water 
is certainly not a reduction of pollution. It is an addition of 
pollutants to the receiving body of water that requires an NPDES 
permit.205 
B. EPA’s Water Transfers Rule is Untenable in Light of the CWA. 
Even accepting ambiguity in the statute, the EPA’s 
interpretation is untenable when considered with the overriding 
policy and purpose of the CWA. In its 2005 Interpretation Paper, 
the EPA focused on Section 101(g), which states that it is 
Congress’ further intent to “prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution in concert with programs managing water sources.”206 
The EPA interprets this as focusing on Congress’ intent to leave 
nonpoint source pollution control to the states.207 This is a valid 
point and is reinforced by the legislative history of the 1972 Act, 
stating that “[i]t is the Committee’s intent to restore the balance of 
Federal-State effort in the program.”208 However, the Senate 
Report also states that “[t]he Federal Government as the custodian 
of the navigable waters has the responsibility to control 
affirmatively any discharges of pollutants into the navigable 
waters.”209 The report goes on to mention that the intent is for 
states to implement their own permitting program,210 and once that 
is accomplished and approved by the EPA, then and only then 
should the Federal Government hand over control of discharges to 
the states. “If the Administrator finds that a State program is 
inadequate to mitigate his involvement he should not approve a 
State program.”211 By the EPA’s own account, as of 2005, only 
Pennsylvania had implemented NPDES permits for transfers from 
one body of water to another.212 Logic would suggest that the EPA 
should still be charged with regulating the discharges of pollutants 
from point sources. Regulation is not a state issue until a state 
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presents an approved NPDES system of its own for regulation. 
State responsibility is limited to nonpoint sources of pollutants and 
transfers are not nonpoint sources.213 
The EPA’s reliance on Section 101(g) is further flawed in that 
it was enacted as part of the Amendments in 1977. The Senate 
Report states that “the overall thrust and objectives of the program 
should not be abandoned, and . . . the correction required is modest 
at best.”214 The “overall thrust and objective” of the CWA is to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”215 Allowing a point source to 
discharge pollutants into a navigable waterway would abandon that 
objective, and any interpretation leading to such a conclusion is 
untenable. Accepting, ad arguendo, the notion that all waters of 
the United States are a unitary whole would still allow the 
movement of pollutants around the system, which does nothing to 
“restore” the integrity of the Nation’s waters. This result is an 
absurd conclusion and must be dismissed as impermissible.  
From a jurisprudential standpoint, the very argument upon 
which the Water Transfers Rule is based failed time and time again 
prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling. The Second Circuit explicitly 
stated that the idea that two separate bodies of water could be 
considered the same so as to prevent any addition was 
unreasonable.216 The Supreme Court of the United States called the 
idea that permits are only required when pollutants originate in 
point sources “untenable.”217 Even the EPA’s own Interpretation 
Paper offers a contradiction of the Water Transfers Rule. In a 
footnote at the end of its paper, the EPA states that discharges of 
pollutants include point sources that do not generate pollutants 
themselves.218 Because point sources are regulated by Section 402, 
and transfers are point sources, they too would fall under Section 
402 and require NPDES permits when they discharge pollutants 
into a navigable water body. A theory that the courts called both 
“unreasonable” and “untenable” cannot pass the Chevron test for 
deference.  
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C. The Water Transfers Rule Fails to Protect the Louisiana 
Wetlands 
Current EPA guidelines have failed to solve the problems of 
coastal land loss and the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Currently, states in the Mississippi River basin have no numerical 
water quality standards for phosphorus in rivers or streams or for 
nitrogen in any waters.219 Additionally, most states do not attempt 
to limit nitrogen and phosphorus discharges in NPDES permits.220 
Louisiana is now moving forward with plans to open a new 
diversion from the Mississippi River into the Louisiana wetlands. 
The Mid-Barataria diversion is scheduled to open in 2015 through 
funding provided by the BP payments.221 This diversion, only one 
of ten proposed, would pump up to 250,000 cubic feet per second 
of water and sediment from the Mississippi River into the 
wetlands, along with all the nitrogen and phosphorus contained in 
the water.222 In fact, the proposed diversions have the capacity to 
pump 50% of the Mississippi River’s water into the wetlands.223 
Without regulation, these diversions could end up pumping 
polluted water into the wetlands at an unfettered rate.  
Courts are recognizing the need for federal involvement in 
nonpoint source pollution control. Environmentalists recently won 
a small victory in the Eastern District of Louisiana.224 The Gulf 
Restoration Network (GRN) requested that the EPA establish 
numeric water quality standards for the Gulf waters outside of state 
control and all waterways in states that do not already have 
numeric water quality standards. The EPA refused to do so and did 
not state a reason why.225 The GRN relied on Section 303(c)(4) of 
the CWA, which states “in any case where the Administrator 
determines that a revised or new standard is necessary to meet the 
requirements of this chapter,” the Administrator “shall promptly 
prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth a revised or 
new water quality standard for the navigable waters involved.”226 
Judge Zainey recognized the need for a federal role and ordered 
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the EPA to respond to the GRN’s petition by conducting a 
necessity determination for new numerical water quality 
standards.227 
The wetlands are a meaningfully distinct body of water under 
the Significant Nexus Test from Riverside Bayview Homes.228 
Some opponents of this position argue that but for the man-made 
levees and flood protection structures, the Mississippi River would 
naturally flow into the wetlands and disperse its water and sediment 
throughout the wetlands and the distributaries within. While it is true 
that the river would flow into the wetlands naturally, the wetlands 
currently should be considered meaningfully distinct from the 
Mississippi. “During the past two centuries the hydrology of the 
distributary zone was totally modified by the construction of flood 
levees and closing of key distributaries . . . . These structures 
isolated the river from its delta, causing an ongoing catastrophic 
collapse in the deltaic landscape, primarily wetlands.”229 Instead of 
regulating the wetlands under the conditions from 200 years ago, it 
makes more sense to regulate the wetlands based on their current 
condition.  
Because the wetlands are meaningfully distinct, the Eastern 
District’s ruling would also require establishing numerical water 
quality standards for the wetlands. If these established standards 
cannot be met through BAT, the EPA must then establish TMDLs 
for the wetlands. In order for any discharge of pollutants into the 
wetlands, the point source discharging the pollutants would require 
an NPDES permit to ensure that the TMDLs are met for the 
wetlands.  
However, the Water Transfers Rule means that Louisiana can 
no longer rely on NPDES permits to help combat the spread of 
pollution into the wetlands through diversions.230 The Rule allows 
northern states to contribute significantly more pollutants into the 
Mississippi River through simple transfers with no consequences 
for doing so. Louisiana, however, will deal with the consequences 
in the form of a more highly polluted Mississippi River that will 
exacerbate the growth of the Gulf dead zone every year. Through 
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the diversions, these pollutants will invade the wetlands and 
degrade the plant life by a loss of soil strength. With weakened soil 
strength, plants are more vulnerable to storms and will become 
uprooted more easily. Additionally, the loss of the wetlands will 
endanger the livelihood of the fisherman who depend upon them as 
well as the communities that live further inland. The Water 
Transfers Rule weakens Louisiana’s ability to protect its waters 
from pollution and prevents the NPDES program from protecting 
downstream states from out-of-state pollution that is beyond their 
control.231 State nonpoint source regulations, Section 208 permits, 
do not protect Louisiana. As one commentator stated, “[A] well-
designed monitoring program is essential to assess whether 
diversions are promoting marsh sustainability and to support 
adaptive management of diversions.”232  
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Given the complexity of managing the Nation’s waters and the 
differing needs in each region, it is impossible to perfectly cater to 
each region’s needs with one solution. Likely, each region will 
need an individualized solution, but it is possible to come up with a 
general framework for each region to alter based on that region’s 
specific needs and concerns. This Comment considers one 
proposed solution of a General Permit System designed for the 
problems in the western states and offers another solution that is 
more applicable to the country as a whole.  
A. General Permit Systems 
The western United States depends on a complex system of 
water transfers to get water to urban areas as well as agricultural 
zones that need water for irrigation.233 Often these transfers carry 
water across state lines. Without uniform, federal NPDES 
standards in place, there could be different standards for different 
sections of the same transfer. Having to meet different standards 
along the way will increase the cost of the transfer system as well 
as make the transfer incredibly inefficient.  
Reagen proposed a General Permit System that would cover all 
discharges for a single body of water or all point sources in a 
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complex diversion system, such as those out west.234 A general 
permit system would balance the feasibility and efficiency sought 
in water pollution control with actual protection of waters.235 It 
would also solve the problem of the expensive permitting process 
for some of the diversions, such as the Colorado-Big Thompson 
Project, which would cost over $315 million in permit fees—more 
than twice the cost of the project itself.236 A General Permit 
System would also reduce paperwork and create an easily 
administered pollution control system.237 
However, this system does not solve the problems in 
Louisiana. Louisiana has an even more complicated system of 
waterways that lead to the wetlands and the Gulf. Considering all 
of these as a single body of water as would be necessary under a 
general permitting system would over-simplify the matter. History 
has shown that it is not always easy to determine what qualifies as 
a navigable waterway and what does not.238 Issuing one general 
permit for the entire system of Louisiana wetlands would open the 
possibility of some sources contributing a disproportionate amount 
of pollutants, resulting in highly vulnerable weak links in the 
wetlands. Adding to the complexity, some of these sources may be 
underground and out of sight.239 In sum, these general permit 
systems would not provide the same protection that individual 
NPDES permits would.  
B. Water Quality Credit Trading Program 
“Water Quality Trading is an innovative, market-based 
approach that if used in certain watersheds can achieve water 
quality standards more efficiently and at [a] lower cost than 
traditional approaches.”240 Water Quality Trading Programs 
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(WQTPs) allow point sources, subject to NPDES permits, to 
purchase credits from upstream nonpoint sources to ease their cost 
of meeting the TMDLs for the body of water.241 It is often cheaper 
for upstream nonpoint sources to implement controls over 
agricultural discharges than it is to control them later downstream at 
a single point source. The purchasing of credits allows point source 
permit-holders to lower their cost substantially while still 
maintaining pollution concentrations below the TMDLs established 
for the body of water.  
Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable 
Coast from 2012 (Master Plan) makes it clear that in Louisiana’s 
view, it is “no longer a question of whether we will do large scale 
diversions, but how we will do them.”242 The Master Plan focuses 
on sediment diversions as opposed to freshwater diversions because 
the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority views sediment 
diversions as “essential to sustaining coastal Louisiana.”243 Because 
it seems apparent that sediment diversions are inevitable at this 
point, it is essential to design a program that incorporates them into 
real reductions of pollutants in the wetlands.  
Establishing a WQTP for the entire Mississippi River valley 
would benefit all states that lie along the Mississippi River and that 
have tributaries to the Mississippi. Under the proposed program, all 
states would work together to establish a joint association to monitor 
a credit exchange for nonpoint sources to sell their credits and point 
sources to purchase credits. Indeed, the CWA even encourages the 
establishment of such an exchange.244  
In a credit exchange the nonpoint sources will generate 
pollutant load reductions using best management practices (BMPs) 
that go beyond their required reductions. These excess reductions 
can be sold as credits to the exchanges. The exchanges will then 
sell the credits to point sources for less than what it would cost the 
point sources to meet their water quality based effluent limits 
(WQBELs). These exchanges can be regulated by the EPA or 
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vicariously by the association established by the states. The price 
of the credits and the ratio of how much pollution reduction will 
constitute a credit can be established by the newly created 
association as well.245 
It is important for the EPA to consider a WQTP when 
establishing TMDLs for the Mississippi River and the wetlands. 
Given the recent Gulf Restoration Network decision from the 
Eastern District, it is probable the EPA will need to reestablish new 
effluent limits for the Mississippi River and subsequent TMDLs.246 
A Trading Program should be considered when establishing these 
new limits.247  
Another important point is that the Credit Trading Program is 
not a substitute for the NPDES permits. The TMDLs and the 
NPDES permits are essential for the success of the Trading 
Program because they will act as the market drivers by creating a 
demand for the credits.248 Without the permit requirements, the 
diversions will not have any reason to purchase the credits and 
subsequently the nonpoint sources further up the river will not 
have any reason to reduce their emissions with BMPs. The 
ultimate goal is to reduce the nutrient pollution in the Mississippi 
River in order to prevent an influx of harmful nitrogen and 
phosphorus into the wetlands.  
This solution also addresses the issue of the states maintaining 
control over their own water regulation because the nonpoint 
source regulation under Section 208 will still be left to the states. 
Further, every state along the Mississippi River already regulates 
its own NPDES permits.249 This solution allows states to maintain 
control over their water regulation while working with other states 
to produce desirable results for all states involved. The upriver 
states benefit in that their farmers can cheaply reduce their 
emissions with BMPs and then sell the generated credits for a 
profit. The downstream states benefit in that their point source 
permit holders can meet their permit limits by purchasing the 
credits for less than it would cost them to implement the reductions 
themselves. NPDES permit holders will still need to meet the 
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required Technology Based Effluent Limits (TBELs) that are 
imposed on all point sources. Again, the Trading Program is not an 
end-run around responsibility for pollution emissions. The Trading 
Program is simply a means for point sources to achieve their 
established WQBEL when the TBELs fall short.  
A WQTP could work for the western states as well; the entire 
Colorado-Big Thompson system could be governed by one trading 
association if all of the states are willing to work together. A 
WQTP also addresses the concern of costs by helping to regulate 
pollution in a cost-effective manner, thereby reducing the cost for 
everyone involved.  
Establishing TMDLs for the Louisiana wetlands as 
meaningfully distinct bodies of water would require NPDES 
permits for any diversion that wishes to discharge pollutants from 
the Mississippi River. Because the diversions would need NPDES 
permits to meet the TMDLs, these point sources would be able to 
purchase credits from upstream nonpoint sources, shifting the 
burden of reducing the pollutants to the actual sources of those 
pollutants. Nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations will fall in the 
Mississippi River, and subsequently, fewer pollutants will flow 
into the wetlands. Obtaining an NPDES permit will be easier and 
cheaper for the proposed diversions because of the WQTPs. This 
solution produces a cost-effective way of producing real results 
and maintaining the health and integrity of the Nation’s waters.  
CONCLUSION 
Instead of protecting the waters of the United States, the EPA 
put them in danger with the promulgation of the Water Transfers 
Rule. Allowing highly polluted water to enter clean water suitable 
for drinking through the simple use of a transfer is an abomination 
of the purpose and intent of the CWA. “If an ‘addition . . . to 
navigable waters’ occurs only at a pollutant’s first entry into 
navigable waters, and never again when it is transferred to a 
different water body, then the NPDES program—the centerpiece 
of the Clean Water Act—would require no permit for a project to 
pump the most loathsome navigable water in the country into the 
most pristine one.”250 Even with this statement, the Eleventh 
Circuit erroneously gave deference to the Water Transfers Rule.  
The Water Transfers Rule fails the Chevron test for deference 
because the wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The 
absence of the word “any” before “navigable waters” is 
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inconsequential. As pointed out, “navigable waters” is a 
jurisdictional term and should not be over-analyzed. The 
substantive words of the statute are “any addition of any pollutant . . . 
from any point source.”251 These words are clear and do not require 
further interpretation. Even assuming the EPA’s contention that the 
statute is ambiguous, the EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable in 
light of the stated purpose of the CWA. The Water Transfers Rule 
allows some waterways of the United States to become more 
polluted. It is beyond unreasonable to interpret an act entitled the 
Clean Water Act to allow for making water less clean.  
Louisiana needs the protection that the Water Transfers Rule 
takes away. There needs to be protection of the wetlands. The 
wetlands provide important protection from hurricanes and are 
home to many different species of wildlife. Fishermen depend on 
the wetlands for their livelihood. The wetlands constitute a 
meaningfully distinct body of water and need to have TMDLs 
established to monitor the level of pollutants. Establishing TMDLs 
then requires NPDES permits for any discharge of pollutants into 
the wetlands so as to maintain the TMDL limit.  
Once the sediment diversions are required to adhere to the 
TMDL established for the wetlands, the diversions (run by the 
state) will have an incentive to purchase Water Quality Credits 
from upstream nonpoint sources, thereby reducing not only the 
concentration of pollutants in the Mississippi River, but also the 
concentration of pollutants in the Louisiana wetlands. The Water 
Quality Credit Trading Program will produce a cost-effective 
reduction in pollution of the Nation’s waters.  
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